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ABSTRACT
This article presents the epistemology of a new but mostly neglected subject ‘admissibility of surveillance evidence.’ 
It addresses the complex issues around‘the proper limits of covert surveillance’ and ‘whether evidence obtained by the 
public authority in breach of statutory provision should be ruled inadmissible.’ Further, it analyses issues that have a 
profound relationship with ‘individual’s right of privacy’ and ‘public authority’s duties of conducting surveillance.’ In 
this research much emphasis is placed on case laws as persuasive precedents as there are no adequate statutory laws in 
some countries like Bangladesh and Malaysia which deal with this subject. It is hoped that the results of this research 
would attract the attention of policy-makers of some interested countries. It is also hoped that reasonable ethical and 
legal safeguards should be implemented to protect the rights of the people from future abuse.
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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini mengutarakan suatu isu baru tetapi telah lama diabaikan berkaitan kebolehterimaan ‘keterangan pemantauan’ 
atau ‘surveillance evidence’ serta asas, skop dan kesahannya. Ianya menyingkap isu kompleks berkaitan ‘had pemantauan 
rahsia yang dibenarkan’ serta ‘persoalan samada keterangan sedemikian yang diperolehi oleh pihak berkuasa dengan cara 
yang menyalahi peruntukan statut harus ditolak.’ Artikel ini seterusnya menganalisis isu hubung kait dan perimbangan 
antara ‘hak privasi individu’ dan ‘tanggungjawab pihak berkuasa untuk melaksanakan tugas-tugas pemantauan.’ Dalam 
kajian ini, penekanan banyak diberikan kepada kes-kes yang persuasif disebabkan ketiadaan peruntukan undang-undang 
yang mencukupi di negara-negara seperti Bangladesh dan Malaysia yang yang menangani isu ini. Adalah diharapkan 
agar hasil kajian ini akan menarik perhatian pembuat polisi di negara lain. Adalah diharapkan juga agar perlindungan 
yang munasabah yang beretika serta mematuhi undang-undang dapat diimplementasikan untuk melindungi hak orang 
awam daripada dicerobohi.
Kata kunci: Pemantauan dan pengintipan maklumat; kebolehterimaan keterangan pemantauan; hak privasi; pencerobohan 
privasi
INTRODUCTION
According to Warren and Brandeis, ‘Numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that what 
is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops.’1 This prediction became reality as technology 
has developed at an unprecedented rate in recent years. 
In parallel with the rapid and prodigious development of 
electronics, the surveillance and interception technologies 
have also improved tremendously. Public authorities, like 
law enforcement agencies and national security wings are 
using sophisticated modern equipment for surveillance 
and interception to eradicate terrorism and hideous crime. 
Innovative technologies have enhanced their ability not 
only to track people through their computerised record 
trail, but also to see through walls, overhear conversations 
and follow the movement of wrong doers. Satellite 
photographs, massive millimeter wave detectors or 
millivision,2 tubular and parabolic microphones,3 van eck 
monitoring device,4 wiretapping, thermal imaging, mobile 
phone tracking are examples of some modern surveillance 
technologies. Nowadays surveillance technologies are 
increasingly used for detecting and investigating offences. 
Courts are acknowledging the fact that electronic 
evidence gathering has significant advantages over more 
conventional means of obtaining information, such as 
providing a direct and contemporaneous account of an 
event, which may avoid many of the threshold evidentiary 
issues.5 But many fears that the abrupt use of surveillance 
technologies could lead to a serious loss of autonomy, 
endangering people’s right of privacy and freedom. It 
should be mentioned that the development of effective 
legal and practical safeguards for individual privacy has 
lagged far behind the pace of technological developments 
and the uptake of surveillance technologies by both the 
public and private sector.6 
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Thus the use of modern technologies in performing 
surveillance and interception tasks are quite vulnerable 
to the legal dispute. Courts often face difficulties in 
understanding how the surveillance evidence was 
derived, processed, and presented when it performs the 
task of ‘weighing the probative value of the information 
against its potential value’ in order to determine 
admissibility. Here, one has to bear in mind that ‘despite 
the tremendous opportunity for technologies to offer 
more informed and cost-effective evidence against a 
crime, the issues of credibility, admissibility, and other 
evidentiary hurdles are impending the integration of these 
technologies into the judicial process.’7 Until scientists 
and attorneys work together ‘to educate tiers of fact to 
develop protocols for general acceptance, courts will be 
reluctant to work through the associated complex science 
and mathematics necessary to assign evidentiary value 
to the information.’8 
The word surveillance derived from the French word 
‘surveiller’ which literally means watching over. But, in 
real life the term is often used for all forms of observation 
or monitoring, not just visual observation. It is commonly 
used to describe observation from a distance by means of 
electronic equipment or other technological means. In a 
broad sense surveillance is a legal investigative process 
entailing a close observing or listening to a person in 
an effort to gather evidentiary information about the 
commission of a crime, or lesser improper behaviour.9 
In the narrow sense, surveillance is the systematic 
monitoring of enemy forces using a variety of electronic 
and optical means as well as other intelligence assets.10 In 
modern time, no one denies the essentiality of surveillance 
in protecting a state’s interest. However, its improper use 
may damage individual’s privacy. Therefore, a logical 
parameter of state surveillance must be determined to 
protect individuals from ‘state authorised’ intrusion. 
Sometimes public authorities’ step beyond their powers 
in performing surveillance which may cause irreparable 
damage of reputation if the surveillance evidence is 
inadvertently exposed to others. Courts remain only as a 
source of justice in these types of cases. 
Despite repeated statutory attempts to regulate police 
and security service interception activity, controversy 
still persists with regard to admissibility of surveillance 
evidence. In this article we are going to discuss three 
basic legal issues which have a profound connection 
with the admissibility of surveillance evidence. They 
are as follows:
1. Are the directed and intrusive surveillance activities 
justified?
2. Are the data or evidence collected and conserved by 
surveillance and interception gadgets admissible in 
the court room?
3. Are there any limits that can be placed on the power 
of technology for protecting individual’s right of 
privacy? 
ARE THE DIRECTED AND INTRUSIVE 
SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES JUSTIFIED?
Jane Austen opined that “I am afraid my inquiry has 
been impertinent, but I had not supposed any secrecy 
intended….”11 Similarly, Blackstone long ago wrote that 
“Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, 
or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and 
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are 
a common nuisance,” punishable at common law.12 But 
this is not always true. Law enforcement authorities often 
perform surveillance and interception tasks to eradicate 
terrorism and hideous crime which could be to some 
extent interpreted as ‘intrusion of privacy’ of individuals. 
Many jurists promote the view that it is essential to use 
surveillance or interception devices ‘in cases vitally 
affecting the domestic security.’13 They advocate that 
law enforcement authorities should be given the power 
to approve the installation of surveillance devices when 
required in the interest of internal security or national 
safety. But privacy is citizens’ fundamental right and any 
intrusion upon it cannot be justified easily. 
As a consequence, there is a public policy dilemma 
as public authorities and lawmakers seek a balance 
between the public interest in the prevention of crime 
and the need for constraints on state power to intrude 
into the individual’s life. In an attempt to find a balance 
between the interests of the individual and the interest 
of the state, ‘Proportionality’ becomes a vital factor.14 
Now the question arises what is proportionate, and what 
is not? The European Court defines proportionality as ‘if 
a measure, which restricts a right, does so in such a way 
as to impair the very essence of the right it will almost 
certainly be disproportionate.’15 Furthermore, the need to 
have relevant and sufficient reasons provided in support 
of the particular measure has been emphasised in Jersild 
v Denmark as: “The Court will look at the interference 
complained of in light of the case as a whole and 
determine whether the reasons adduced by the national 
authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient and 
whether the means employed were proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.”16
To make proportionate measure the public authority 
must ensure that there is no less restrictive alternative 
available. It is unlikely that a measure could be considered 
to be proportionate where a less restrictive alternative 
was available. As stated by Harris et al. “action for the 
prevention of crime may be directed against homicide 
or parking offences: the weight of each compared with 
the right sought to be limited is not the same.”17 Thus a 
balancing exercise takes place that requires a consideration 
of whether the interference with the right is greater than 
is necessary to achieve the aim.18 In Campbell v United 
Kingdom19 a blanket rule on the opening of prisoners’ 
mail was found to be a disproportionate response to the 
problem identified and thus was in breach of Article.8 
of European Charter of Human Right. The argument 
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put forward by the Government that the interference 
was necessary to ensure that prohibited material was 
not contained in the mail was rejected on the grounds 
that the same policy objective could have been met by 
opening the mail in the presence of the prisoner without 
actually reading it.20
A further factor in the proportionality equation is 
“to assess the adequacy of procedural fairness in the 
decision making process. Where a public body has 
exercised a discretion that restricts an individual’s 
rights, the rights of the affected individual should have 
been taken into account.”21 Proportionality can be more 
easily established where it could be shown that there are 
sufficient safeguards against abuse in place. This was 
expressed clearly in Klass v Germany:22 “One of the 
fundamental principles of a democratic society is the 
rule of law ... [which] implies, inter alia, that interference 
by the executive authorities with an individual’s rights 
should be subject to an effective control ...”23 Given that 
“most policing actions will have a basis in law and will 
invariably satisfy the requirement of being in pursuit of 
a legitimate objective the crux of a case will often be the 
proportionality of the action under scrutiny.”24
In the light of the above discussion, we may conclude 
that public authorities should act with prudence and be 
cautious about the fact that any unscrupulous conduct 
could cause severe intrusion upon one’s privacy. It should 
be mentioned that if a measure, which restricts the right 
of an individual, and does so in such a way as to impair 
the very essence of the right, it will almost certainly 
be disproportionate.25 Furthermore, whatever system 
of surveillance is adopted, there must be adequate and 
effective guarantees against abuse. It was decided in Klass 
v Germany 26 admissibility of surveillance depends on 
the following facts:
1. the nature, scope and duration of the possible 
measures, 
2. the grounds required for ordering such measures, 
3. the authorities are competent to permit, carry out and 
supervise such measures, and 
4. the kind of remedy provided by national law.27
In Klass v Germany 28 the Court further acknowledged 
the significance of the technical advances made in 
surveillance as well as the development of terrorism, 
and recognised that the state must be entitled to counter 
terrorism with secret surveillance of mail, post and 
telecommunications. But such measures must be taken 
in exceptional circumstances and the state does not have 
the right to adopt whatever measures it thinks appropriate 
in the name of counteracting espionage, terrorism or 
serious crime.29 
Further, in this case, the Court provided the following 
general guidance as to the application of Article 8 
of ECHR30 to the prevailing German legislation that 
authorises surveillance:
1. The legislation must be designed to ensure that 
surveillance is not ordered haphazardly, irregularly 
or without due and proper care;
2. Surveillance must be reviewed and must be 
accompanied by procedures which guarantee 
individual rights;
3. It is in principle desirable to entrust the supervisory 
control to a judge in accordance with the rule of 
law, but other safeguards might suffice if they are 
independent and vested with sufficient powers to 
exercise an effective and continuous control;
4. If the surveillance is justified under Article 8(2) the 
failure to inform the individual under surveillance 
of this fact afterwards is, in principle, justified.31
Recently in Tessling,32 the Canadian Supreme Court 
considered whether, in the absence of prior judicial 
authorisation, the surveillance conducted by Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police for detecting cannabis growing 
facilities owned by the respondent from the airspace 
using an infra-red camera, breached the right against 
unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by section 
8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. In this case the court reaffirmed the value 
of privacy and stated that “few things are as important 
to our way of life as the amount of power allowed the 
police to invade the homes, privacy and even the bodily 
integrity of members of Canadian society without 
judicial authorization.”33 The court further noted that 
“privacy of the person perhaps has the strongest claim to 
constitutional shelter because it protects bodily integrity, 
and in particular the right not to have our bodies touched 
or explored to disclose objects or matters which we wish 
to conceal.”34 The court reiterated that section 8 of the 
Charter protects ‘people, not places’ and that the original 
notion of territorial privacy had “developed into a more 
nuanced hierarchy protecting privacy in the home, being 
the place where our most intimate and private activities 
are most likely to take place.”35 The court acknowledged 
that informational privacy was a ‘thorny issue’ concerning 
“how much information about ourselves and activities 
we are entitled to shield from the curious eyes of the 
State.”36 In this case the court adopted a ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ test that was evolved in R v Edwards.37 
The tests are as follows:
1. Did the Respondent Have a Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy?
a. What was the subject-matter of the infra-red 
image?
b. Did the respondent have a direct interest in the 
subject-matter of the image?
c. Did the respondent have a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the subject-matter of the image?
d. If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable? 
In determining this it was necessary to have 
regard to:
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i. whether the subject matter was in public 
view;
ii. whether the subject matter had been 
abandoned;
iii. whether the information was already 
in the hands of third parties and if so, 
whether it was subject to an obligation of 
confidentiality;
iv. whether the police technique was intrusive 
in relation to the privacy interest;
v. whether the use of surveillance technology 
was itself objectively unreasonable;
vi. whether the infrared image exposed any 
intimate details of the respondent's lifestyle, 
or information of a biographical nature.
2. If There Was a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 
Was It Violated by The Police Conduct?
 On the facts, no violation of the respondent’s rights 
under section 8 of the Charter was found in Tessling. 
It should be suggested that Tessling test provides 
a clear guidance in determining the periphery of 
the right of privacy in cases where privacy of an 
individual is subject to intrusion. 
  The European Court adopted the most acceptable 
approach and provided proper guidelines to 
determine whether an interception is ultra vires or 
not. In a 1998 report, JUSTICE38 summarises those as 
comprising:
a. Legitimacy: Public authorities should not step 
beyond their jurisdiction and act legitimately. 
Proper disclosure should be maintained so 
that citizens are aware of the circumstances 
under which surveillance may be undertaken 
or communications intercepted.
b. Essentiality: The interference should be 
essential.
c. Proportionality: The intrusive measures should 
be proportional to the seriousness of the offence, 
bearing in mind the rights not only of the 
individual but also those of others likely to be 
affected.
d. Accountability: There must be proper controls 
and adequate and effective remedies against 
abuse.
But when the public authorities become the intruders, 
the consequences are apt to prove more than a mere 
nuisance. For example, the UK allows the interception of 
telephone calls, emails, letters and faxes by authorisation 
of the Home Secretary rather than by a judge. In America, 
there exists a similar system of warrantless surveillance 
operated by the National Security Agency. Bangladesh 
and the UK’s system of interception without prior 
judicial authorisation or American system of warrantless 
surveillance is a threat to the privacy of an individual.39 
Section 97(a) Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 
2001 empowers Minister or Home Minister to order the 
public authority to approve tapping of any telephone, 
or recording of the intercepted message without prior 
authorisation of the judiciary. Further, section 97(a) of 
this Act states that any information obtained under section 
97(a) shall be considered as an admissible evidence in 
all circumstances, even if it conflicts with the Evidence 
Act 1872 (Bangladesh) or other statuary provisions. It 
means if surveillance evidence is obtained illegally or if 
a public authority acts beyond its jurisdiction in procuring 
surveillance evidence, that evidence should not be treated 
as inadmissible in the court. This is a pure inclusionary 
rule that undermines the individual’s right of privacy. 
Moreover, the investigatory activities authorised by the 
Telecommunication Act 2001 (Bangladesh) inevitably 
make an impact on the privacy of the affected individual. 
In most instances, it is clear that this impact constitutes 
an interference with the right to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence, as protected by 
our constitution.40 We must admit that law of Bangladesh 
has failed to keep pace with the ever more sophisticated 
surveillance techniques available not just to eager law 
enforcement agencies but also to possibly unscrupulous 
private persons. The Telecommunication Act 2001 
(Bangladesh) falls far short of an effective Parliamentary 
response. It is unfortunate that law of Bangladesh still 
does not offer a single legal regulatory system to deal 
with the surveillance and the interception technology. 
Thus the law remains weak in terms of the imposition 
of regulation and the protection for privacy in electronic 
communications. 
In Malaysia, no person or authority can offer 
multimedia service to the people without first obtaining 
licence from the Government. Media law in Malaysia is 
governed by the Communications and Multimedia Act 
1998 (CMA 1998) and Printing Presses and Publications 
Act 1984. Under CMA 1998 “communications” means 
any communication, whether between persons and 
persons, things and things, or persons and things, in 
the form of sound, data, text, visual images, signals 
or any other form or any combination of those forms. 
The CMA 1998 came into effect on 1 April 1999 and 
repealed the Telecommunications Act 1950 and the 
Broadcasting Act 1988 (Malaysia). The CMA 1998 
provides a regulatory framework for the convergence 
of the telecommunications, broadcasting and computing 
industries. It creates a licensing mechanism and 
states the roles and responsibilities of those providing 
communication and multimedia services.
Under the CMA 1998 “The Minister may determine 
that a licensee or class of licensees shall implement 
the capability to allow authorised interception of 
communications.”41 This section provides wide power 
to the relevant Minister to intercept communication of 
information and no safeguard has been provided against 
this section. The CMA 1998 also provides that “On the 
occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of 
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public safety, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the Central 
King of Malaysia) or the Minister authorised by him in 
that behalf may intercept any communication through 
the network.”42
Therefore, the CMA 1998 authorises the Government 
of Malaysia to intercept of communication through the 
internet or other electronic media on the ground of the 
occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest 
of public safety. However, the Government should 
make sure that people’s privacy right is not violated 
unreasonably while exercising this interception power 
under section 266 of the CMA 1998. In other words, when 
there is no emergency situation exists or public safety 
is not an issue, the Malaysian Government should not 
invoke the statutory provision provided in section 266. If 
this statutory provision is violated, the government might 
be liable for misuse of the statutory provision.
In Mohd. Abdul Aziz Ibrahim v PP,43 the High Court 
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia ruled that CCTV footage would 
be inadmissible if not accompanied with a certificate or 
at least oral testimony to back it. This was a murder case 
and the prosecution failed to prove the case with a CCTV 
footage certificate or oral testimony. 
Now the question is how far this covert video 
surveillance evidence gathered by the help of modern and 
sophisticated video surveillance devices is admissible as 
evidence in the court. There is no so far any hard and fast 
rule on this issue and the court decides on a case by case 
basis, taking into account the importance of protecting the 
security of the State and its people on the one side and the 
personal privacy issue of people on the other side.44
As we know, covert surveillance involves an invasion 
of people’s privacy. Therefore, avoid acting unlawfully; 
it is necessary that the investigatory activities be justified 
under a new act with sufficient safeguard. This requires 
that the activity is both necessary for one of the specified 
aims, which include the interests of national security 
and the prevention of crime, and in accordance with 
the law. Unfortunately, most of countries do not have 
healthy regulation of conducting surveillance. We have 
so far studied the statutes of 23 countries that authorised 
domestic surveillance, the details of which included 
in the table: 1, placed in the Appendix. Unfortunately, 
most of the statues that the authorised surveillance are 
designed to undermine individual’s right of privacy and 
they severely lacked the democratic characteristics. In this 
case, the court remains the main source of justice. In this 
circumstance the courts must assess the validity of public 
authority’s action against a set of coherent standards. 
These include consideration of whether the action in 
question satisfies a legitimate ground for interference with 
the right, and, equally, whether such action is necessary 
and proportionate.45
 ARE THE DATA OR EVIDENCE COLLECTED 
AND CONSERVED BY MODERN-DAY 
SURVEILLANCE AND INTERCEPTION GADGETS 
ADMISSIBLE IN THE COURT?
Public authorities concerned with law enforcement and 
national security, have been engaged in surveillance 
and interception activities for many years. To a 
significant extent, these forms of investigation were 
“historically unregulated. However, as the prevalence 
and technological capabilities of surveillance developed, 
so too did the awareness of the threat to privacy and the 
demands for regulation.”46 The enactments of various 
regulations regarding surveillance were a response to both 
areas of development. On the one hand, these regulations 
“facilitated the use of diverse investigatory activities, 
while on the other, they provided a comprehensive 
regulatory framework, designed to respect individual’s 
right of privacy.”47 In so doing, it maintained a frail 
balance between the competing demands of privacy and 
surveillance. The balance between respect for privacy 
and the facilitation of investigatory activities is indeed a 
fragile one and a difficult task to maintain. If the public 
authority fails to act properly, judiciary intervenes to 
provide an appropriate remedy to the aggrieved party. 
And it is in large extent true that whatever potentiality 
the surveillance evidence possesses for the enforcement 
agencies, court will not recognise its full prospect due 
to the lack of reliability. Courts always challenge the 
admissibility of evidence procured from surveillance 
and interception gadgets on the basis of the following 
grounds:
1. Surveillance techniques are untrustworthy as there 
remain chances of manipulation. A manipulated 
datum or photograph or information is not admissible 
as evidence.
2. Sometimes public authorities act beyond their 
jurisdiction and obtain evidence illegally, which may 
make the evidence inadmissible.
SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES ARE UNTRUSTWORTHY 
AS THERE REMAIN CHANCES OF MANIPULATION: 
A MANIPULATED DATUM OR PHOTOGRAPH OR 
INFORMATION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
Courts have a tendency to question about the authenticity 
and reliability of an information that derived from high-
tech surveillance gadgets. The standards that are essential 
for determining the admissibility of digital evidence 
derived from surveillance gadgets are as follows:
1. Relevance: Courts admit only relevant evidence. So, 
evidence must be logically connected to the dispute 
and must have probative value.
2. Authenticity: Once evidence is found to be relevant, 
it must be authenticated. It means there must be 
a guarantee of trustworthiness attached to the 
evidence.48 Authentication standards are meant ‘to 
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ensure that the evidence is what it purports to be, 
and how rigorous a foundation is needed to make 
this finding depends on the existence of something 
that can be tested in order to prove a relationship 
between the evidence and an individual and control 
against the perpetration of fraud.’49
3. Reliability: Another evidentiary lynchpin is that 
evidence must be original. This rule is known as 
the ‘Best Evidence Rule’. As per American law an 
‘original’ of a writing or recording is the writing or 
recording itself or any counterpart intended to have 
the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. If 
data are stored in a computer or similar device, any 
printout or other output readable by sight, shown to 
reflect the data accurately, is an original.50 A similar 
approach was discovered in Ohio v. Morris.51 In this 
case the government’s forensic analyst copied the 
hard drive of the Defendant’s computer and returned 
it to the police department that seized it. However, 
prior to returning the computer, the analyst erased 
all the data on the drive. The evidence in question 
was actually presented at trial in the form of a copy 
of the hard drive. The Defendant argued that his 
due process rights were violated because he could 
not examine the original hard drive to determine 
whether it contained exculpatory evidence. The 
appellate court held that testimony about the imaging 
techniques of the software used to create a copy of 
the original drive was sufficient to show that the 
duplicate was admissible. This case suggests that 
exact replication of the original digital evidence 
derived from surveillance carries the same value 
equivalent to the original. 
To determine reliability, the Court suggested five 
criteria in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.52 
These are as follows: 
1. Whether the information is derived by the scientific 
method,
2. Whether the information has been subjected to peer 
review or publication, 
3. Whether the relevant scientific community ‘generally 
accepts’ the information, 
4. Consideration of the actual or potential rate of error 
of the scientific technique, and 
5. Whether standards for controlling the technique’s 
operation exist.
These five criteria are very crucial to determine 
reliability of digital evidence. Therefore, almost all digital 
surveillance evidence is subject to this rule. Furthermore, 
the International Organization on Computer Evidence 
(IOCE) provided the following guidelines that can also be 
used for ensuring reliability of digital evidence:
1. When dealing with digital evidence, all of the general 
forensic and procedural principles must be applied.
2. Upon seizing digital evidence, actions taken should 
not change that evidence.
3. When it is necessary for a person to access original 
digital evidence, that person should be trained for 
the purpose.
4. All activity relating to the seizure, access, storage or 
transfer of digital evidence must be fully documented, 
preserved and available for review.
5. An individual is responsible for all actions taken with 
respect to digital evidence while the digital evidence 
is in his/her possession.
6. Any agency that is responsible for seizing, accessing, 
storing or transferring digital evidence is responsible 
for compliance with these principles.53
A further clear guideline can be found in the U.S 
statute ‘Title - Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968’. In this statute, it is mentioned 
that ‘intercepted communications are required to be 
recorded in a way that will protect the recording from 
editing or alterations. Interceptions are required to be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception 
of communications not otherwise subject to interception. 
This included unrelated, irrelevant, and non-criminal 
communications of the subjects and of others not named 
in the order. Upon expiration of the intercept order, 
or as soon as practicable, the recordings are presented 
to the court of jurisdiction and are sealed. Within a 
reasonable time period after interception, the subjects 
must be furnished with an inventory of the recordings, 
and upon motion, a judge may direct that portion of the 
recordings be made available to the subject for inspection. 
Should the law enforcement agency err in conducting the 
electronic surveillance as authorized in the court order, 
the intercept may be challenged, and if found to have 
been illegally conducted, the evidence in the intercept 
may be suppressed.’ 
SOMETIMES PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ACT BEYOND THEIR 
JURISDICTION AND OBTAIN EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY, WHICH 
MAY MAKE THE EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
Sometimes evidence can be excluded for its illegal nature 
where public authorities act beyond their jurisdiction. 
In the United States, the courts hold any evidence as 
inadmissible, if it is established that the means of gathering 
the evidence was unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful.54 
In Hudson v Michigan55 the US Supreme Court stressed 
that ‘the exclusionary rule should only be applied where 
its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social 
costs.’56 This exclusionary rule rests upon the prohibition 
of unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the 
Fourth Amendment of the USA’s constitution.57 This 
approach was recently adopted by American Court in 
Kyllo III 58 in determining the question “whether the 
warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to detect 
heat sources within a home constitutes an unreasonable 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the 
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United States constitution.” In this case enforcement 
authorities used a thermal imaging device to identify 
indoor cultivation of marijuana plant belonged to Kyllo 
from outdoors without securing a warrant. The survey 
revealed unusually high amounts of heat emanating from 
the walls of Kyllo’s residence. Then a warrant was issued 
and a raid uncovered the presence of an extensive indoor 
marijuana growing facility. Kyllo was convicted of drug 
manufacturing and sentenced to 63 months in prison. 
Kyllo then appealed by saying the warrantless use of the 
thermal imager was unconstitutional.59
It should be mentioned that the indoor marijuana 
cultivation process requires extensive use of artificial 
lighting. These lights generate enormous amounts 
of heat that is emanated outdoors either naturally or 
through a ventilation system installed by the cultivator. 
A thermal imager, placed outside the residence, can be 
used to measure and record the magnitude of these heat 
emissions. In Kyllo I ,60 the Supreme Court held that “the 
use of a thermal imager to detect heat emissions from a 
home is not authorised under the Fourth Amendment 
and is therefore presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.” But later in the Kyllo III ,61 a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit held that the government’s warrantless use of a 
thermal imager was not an unreasonable act and thus the 
evidence is admissible. The court reasoned that as the 
technology merely measured ‘wasted or depleted heat’ 
and did not reveal any ‘intimate details’ inside Kyllo’s 
home, therefore, it was constitutionally legitimate. 
Accordingly, the court also concluded that one’s home 
is not safeguarded from such outside, non-intrusive 
government observation. 
A similar approach was found in United States v 
Knotts,62 the defendant challenged the government’s 
use of a beeper to monitor the transportation of a can of 
chemicals that the police suspected would be used for 
manufacturing lethal drugs. The police used the beeper 
and visual surveillance to track the movement of the 
chemicals in a suspect’s car, and eventually found that the 
signal, once stationary, came from an area near Knotts’ 
cabin. The officers secured a warrant and searched the 
cabin, where they found equipment and chemicals capable 
of producing fourteen pounds of pure amphetamine. The 
Court found no Fourth Amendment violation since the 
movements of the automobile with the can across public 
roads to the ‘open fields’ outside Knotts’ cabin could have 
been observed by the naked eye. 
From the above two cases, it is very evident that 
the U.S.’s judiciary only accept evidence which was not 
procured from an intrusion of privacy of an individual. 
And in Kyllo and Knotts, they successfully redefined the 
parameter of the individual’s privacy.
Until 1982, the Canadian courts adopted ‘inclusionary 
approach’ to deal with illegally or unfairly obtained 
evidence which has a profound connection with 
surveillance. For example, in R v Wray,63 the Court held 
that a trial judge had no discretion to exclude evidence 
of substantial probative value because it was illegally or 
unfairly obtained. Any discretion to exclude admissible 
evidence was “limited to evidence gravely prejudicial 
to the accused, the admission of which is tenuous and 
whose probative force in relation to the main issue before 
the court is trifling.”64 As a result, illegally or unfairly 
obtained evidence could only be excluded when its 
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value or where 
it was either irrelevant or unreliable.65 But, the position 
changed significantly after the enactment of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 (Canada).66 Section 24(2) 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that “If a 
court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner 
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed 
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded, and if it 
is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.”67
In Australia, courts enjoy absolute discretion to 
exclude unlawfully or improperly obtained evidence. 
This is commonly referred to as the public policy 
discretion. The High Court of Australia held that when 
unlawful means are used to procure evidence, the judge 
has discretion to reject it.68 Here Barwick CJ must be 
quoted. In R v Ireland, Barwick CJ said: “Evidence of 
relevant facts or things ascertained or procured by means 
of unlawful or unfair acts is not, for that reason alone, 
inadmissible. This is so, in my opinion, whether the 
unlawfulness derives from the common law or statute. 
But it may be that acts in breach of a statute would more 
readily warrant the rejection of the evidence as a matter 
of discretion or the statute may on its proper construction 
itself impliedly forbid the use of facts or things obtained 
or procured in breach of its terms.” 
On the other hand evidence of facts or things so 
ascertained or procured is not necessarily to be admitted, 
ignoring the unlawful or unfair quality of the acts by 
which the facts sought to be evidenced were ascertained 
or procured. Whenever such unlawfulness or unfairness 
appears, the judge has discretion to reject the evidence. 
He must consider its exercise. In the exercise of it, the 
competing public requirements must be considered and 
weighed against each other. On the one hand there is the 
public interest in the protection of the individual from 
unlawful and unfair treatment. Convictions obtained by 
the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too 
high a price.69 
The basis for the public policy discretion to exclude 
evidence has further been expressed by Stephen and 
Aickin JJ in Bunning v Cross. In this case they said: “Were 
there to occur wholesale and deliberate disregard of these 
(procedural safeguards for the individual) its toleration 
by the courts would result in the effective abrogation 
of the legislature’s safeguards of individual liberties, 
subordinating it to the executive arm. This would not be 
excusable however desirable be the end in view, that of 
convicting the guilty. In appropriate cases it may be ‘a 
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less evil that some criminals should escape than that, the 
Government should play an ignoble part.”70 
But in the United Kingdom the court adopts a 
different approach in deciding the admissibility of 
surveillance evidence. In case R v Khan,71 the House 
of Lords decided that an illegal covert recording of a 
conversation was admissible, even though obtaining 
the recording involved trespass and damage to property 
from the part of public authority. In this case Lord Nolan 
commented that it would be a ‘strange reflection on 
the law’ if a person who had admitted involvement in 
an offence could have the conviction set aside because 
his privacy had been invaded.72 In this case, the Court 
conceded that the installation of the listening device had 
involved a civil trespass. But the Court accepted that 
without the tape recording there would be no case to 
answer. The trial judge, therefore, declined to exclude 
the taped conversations under the prevailing law of the 
UK. Khan was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. 
He made an appeal to the House of Lords. The House 
took the view that the trial judge had been justified in 
not excluding the evidence. Another appeal was made 
to ECJ. Despite finding unanimously that Khan’s right to 
privacy had been violated, the European Court held that 
Khan had received a fair trial.73 
This view was further supported in R. v X.74 In this 
case, defendants were charged with offences related to 
possessing and misusing drugs, and convicted. They 
appealed by saying that evidence of intercepted telephone 
conversations that had been obtained in a foreign 
jurisdiction was inadmissible and should be excluded 
under the regulations of the UK. Dismissing the appeal 
the House of Lords held that the telephone interceptions 
had been undertaken lawfully outside the UK with the 
aim of bringing about a criminal prosecution, and as such 
evidence had not been used for any other purpose nor held 
for longer than was necessary, there had been no illegality 
and the surveillance evidence was admissible. It should be 
mentioned that on balance, the current English case law 
favours the admission of illegal or improper surveillance 
evidence ‘in the absence of blatant bad faith or oppression 
on the part of the investigators.’75 
In summary, it should be noted that once an 
enforcement  authori ty succeeds to maintain 
‘Proportionality’ and ‘Essentiality’ remaining in their 
jurisdiction and if the intercepted evidence is free from 
manipulation and inaccuracy, courts are bound to accept 
that evidence. But the problem arises when public 
authorities procure surveillance evidence illegally. In 
this case, judiciary becomes the saviour. I do agree that 
the constant need surveillance to maintain law and order 
in a state, and the right of privacy stands in two different 
directions. The first recommends the use of desperate 
methods for maintaining peace inside a state, and the 
other prescribes ultimate caution must be maintained to 
safeguard the individual’s right of privacy. 
Therefore a balance must be upheld in all the 
circumstances. It should be remembered “... in respect 
of national security as in respect of other purposes, there 
has to be at least a reasonable and genuine link between 
the aim invoked and the measures interfering with private 
life for the aim to be regarded as legitimate. To refer to 
the more or less indiscriminate storing of information 
relating to the private lives of individuals in terms of 
pursuing a legitimate national security concern is ... 
evidently problematic.”76 Further, where a court believes 
that surveillance evidence is possibly manipulated, it 
may ask for supporting evidence. For example, if X, 
an enforcement agent, produces a satellite image to the 
court to prove that Y is using his company trucks to 
carry illegal equipment and chemicals, court may ask the 
question - whether the satellite had been working properly 
at the time it shot the image, so further proof of correct 
functioning, reliability and accuracy from an expert 
witness might be necessary in this case.77 The Daubert 
standards will be applicable here and satellite data must 
be presented through expert testimony. In doing so one 
must remember the fact that the satellite evidence must 
have an adequate foundation; it must be accurate and 
reliable.78 If accuracy cannot be confirmed, courts will 
not admit the evidence.79
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND SURVEILLANCE 
EVIDENCE
SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY
There are many cases in which courts have admitted 
satellite photographs as evidence. For example, In I&M 
Rail Link v Northstar Navigation,80 satellite photos were 
used to determine whether a barge accident occurred in 
Illinois or Iowa. In Inre Vernon Sand & Gravel, Inc.,81 
aerial photographs were used in settling a land acreage 
discrepancy. In Scruggs v United States,82 an F-16 military 
aircraft and the plaintiff’s civilian plane almost collided 
in mid-air. The plaintiff testified that a cloud prevented 
him from flying at a higher altitude. The court ruled for 
the government because the satellite data showed that 
the area was free of clouds. In Cobb v United States,83 
the plaintiff claimed that a ‘freak’ wave injured him 
when he was a guest on a Navy destroyer. As satellite 
data indicated that no storms were in the area at that 
time, the court ruled for the defendant. Furthermore, 
satellite and aerial photographs have also played a vital 
role in International Court of Justice in Burkina Faso v 
Republic of Mali84 and Namibia v Botswana.85 It must be 
mentioned that satellite and aerial photographs always 
explore the aerial view of an exposed object; therefore, 
its admissibility cannot be challenged on the ground of 
intrusion of privacy. This view was supported in Florida 
v Riley 86 and Dow Chemical Co. v United States.87
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TAPPING TELEPHONES
The use of court authorised electronic surveillance 
became increasingly important as the telephone system 
became a part of everyday life. In the case of Olmstead 
v United States,88 the Court found that tapping a 
telephone did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In 
Olmstead, defendants were convicted for conspiring 
to violate the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305) 
by illegally possessing, transporting, importing and 
selling intoxicating liquors. Four federal prohibition 
officers discovered the information of the conspiracy by 
intercepting the telephones of the conspirators. Wires were 
placed along the ordinary telephone wires from the homes 
and offices of the defendants. The insertion of the wires 
was made without trespassing the defendants’ property. 
The defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to violate 
the National Prohibition Act. Later they appealed on the 
grounds that the prosecution’s case relied exclusively on 
evidence gathered through a wiretap of the defendant’s 
telephone lines in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
which says, “The right of the people to be secured in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”89 
The Supreme Court held that messages passing over 
telephone wires were not within the protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The eavesdropper 
had to have physically trespassed in order for evidence 
procured by wiretapping to be regarded as having been 
obtained unconstitutionally. The Court reasoned that, 
since there was no entry of the homes or offices of the 
defendants, there was no physical trespass. It must be 
stretched out that the Olmstead case was overruled; the 
physical trespass doctrine of Olmstead was abandoned. 
Under current law, in order for electronic surveillance to 
be constitutionally permissible, it must be done, in most 
cases, pursuant to the prior authorisation by a court.90 
In Malone v Commissioner for the Metropolitan 
Police (no. 2),91 the plaintiff was tried at the UK’s Crown 
Court for handling stolen property. During the trial the 
prosecution counsel stated that the plaintiff’s telephone 
was intercepted by the police on the authority of a warrant. 
The warrant was sent to the Post Office and the Post Office 
then made a recording of conversations for the police. 
After being acquitted of the criminal charges, the plaintiff 
brought a civil action against the police claiming that the 
police interception of his phone calls had been unlawful 
as it constituted a breach of confidence, a trespass, and 
an unlawful interference with his privacy. 
The Court held that telephone services provided by 
the Post Office to subscribers were not supplied under a 
contract and it was therefore impossible to imply a term 
that telephone conversations should remain confidential 
and free from tapping. Moreover, the Court indicated 
that ‘on the principle everything was permitted in law 
except that which was expressly forbidden, telephone 
tapping was not unlawful since telephone tapping by 
the Post Office at the request of the police could be 
carried out without any breach of the law, and it did not 
require any statutory or common law power to justify 
it. Furthermore, although there was no statute which 
expressly authorised telephone tapping, where the tapping 
was done under warrant, statutory recognition of the 
lawfulness of the tapping was afforded by s 80 b of the 
Post Office Act 1969. Moreover, telephone tapping was 
not in other respects illegal.’ The Plaintiff took his case 
to the European Court of Human Rights under article 8 
which is concerned with privacy against state interference 
in international law. The European Court of Human 
Rights held that the English practice of interception was 
insufficiently grounded in law to allow it to be justified 
under Article 8(2). As a reaction to this judgment and 
other pending cases, legislation was later passed in the 
form of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 
and the Police Act 1997 Part III.
BUGGING DEVICE
In Goldman v United States,92 the Court held that federal 
agents acted within constitutional guidelines when they 
planted a Dictaphone recording device in a wall to listen 
to conversations taking place inside the next room. In 
On Lee v United States, an undercover agent wearing a 
concealed microphone entered a retail store to investigate 
narcotics violations while another agent listened in 
from a location outside the building.93 No constitutional 
violation was found, since the use of electronic equipment 
substantially resembled the permissible use of bifocals, 
field glasses, or telescopes.94 It was not until the late 
1960s, in the case of Silverman v United States,95 where 
the Court found evidence of an actual trespass by law 
enforcement agents conducting the surveillance activity, 
invading the defendant’s physical space was declared to 
be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.96 
In Berger v New York,97 the Court was faced with 
determining the constitutionality of evidence seized 
through the use of a bugging device planted in a business 
office. In Berger, state agents were investigating 
allegations that an individual was accepting bribes 
in exchange for issuing liquor licenses. Although 
an eavesdropping order was obtained, the majority 
concluded that the provisions authorising the order did 
not satisfy constitutional requirements. Furthermore, 
the length of time eavesdropping permitted was too 
extensive, extensions were granted even without proof 
that the surveillance served the public interest.98 In the 
view of the majority, the Court recognised an intrusion 
on privacy.99
EMAIL
Email is the most popular mode of Internet communication. 
Private messages that once would have been communicated 
via postal mail nowadays occur through email. Private 
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letters, photos, personal financial documents, trade secrets, 
privileged legal and medical information all exchanged 
over email, and stored with email providers after they are 
sent or received. These numerous private uses of email 
demonstrate society’s expectation that the personal emails 
sent and received over the Internet and stored with email 
providers are as private as a sealed letter. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals in United States v Long,100 and United States 
v Maxwell101 supported this view. These cases ruled that 
email account holders have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their stored email. Further, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v Maryland 102 reaffirms that 
the Fourth Amendment protects the contents of stored 
email messages just as it protects the contents of phone 
calls and sealed letters. 
Moreover, under the reasoning of Katz v United 
States103, email users have a constitutionally protected 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in their stored 
email.104 In Katz105, Harlan, J., concurred that Fourth 
Amendment protections apply where “a person [has] 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy…
that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] 
‘reasonable’. The reasonableness of such ‘an expectation 
of privacy in the contents of stored emails is made plain 
by analogy to society’s expectations of privacy in the 
contents of phone calls, the contents of rental residences 
like apartments and hotel rooms, and the contents of 
sealed postal mail.”106 Since Katz, the U.S Supreme Court 
has regularly looked to societal expectations in judging 
Fourth Amendment problems, particularly where new 
technologies are concerned.107 It is equally plain that 
society expects privacy in stored email because email 
users often store their personal messages with the provider 
rather than downloading them onto their own computers 
after sending or receiving an email.108 
It should be mentioned that the email providers have 
the technical ability to access the email account stored on 
their servers without violating the right of privacy of a 
user. Katz and Smith also supported this view. This is why 
Stewart, J., dissented in Smith by saying that “A telephone 
conversation itself must be electronically transmitted by 
telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or 
overheard by the use of other company equipment.”109 
This means the court recognises telephone providers’ 
potential and actual power to intercept phone calls. But 
this right is achieved at the cost of ‘no delegable duty’ 
which should be performed by the telephone company 
or e-mail service provider. In this case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court further held that the user of even a public telephone 
is entitled “to assume that the words he utters into the 
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world”110 If this 
rule is applicable to email then an email provider may 
be able to enjoy the privilege to access the individual’s 
email account but can not have the right to broadcast the 
information to anyone. 
GPS EVIDENCE
Nowadays Global Positioning System (GPS)111 has 
become the technology of choice for tracking and locating 
parolees, and sex-offenders. At least twenty-three states 
in the United States are using GPS for tracking convicted 
sex-offenders and some states are even using GPS for 
tracking low-risk offenders.112 Usually worn as an anklet 
or bracelet by the parolee, GPS tracking has proven to be a 
powerful tool in monitoring of high-risk offenders.113
With regards to admissibility of GPS data as evidence 
courts have regarded GPS technology to be ‘generally 
accepted and fundamentally valid and waived any doubts 
about its credibility.’114 The United States vs Garcia is a 
more recent case which directly involves the use of GPS 
data for tracking suspected criminals. In this case the 7th 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the installation 
of the GPS tracking device in the defendant’s car neither 
constituted a seizure nor search because the device did not 
interfere with the driving qualities of the vehicle and was 
analogous to a police officer following the vehicle.
In the Peterson trial Judge Alfred Delucchi ruled 
that the satellite tracking devices used by the police to 
track Scott Peterson in the days after his wife disappeared 
would be allowed as evidence.115 Further, in 2 BvR 
581/01,116 Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
held that the law enforcement agencies have the right 
to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) to track the 
movements of suspects. In this case, the petitioner was a 
member of a terrorist group. Several government agencies 
investigated the petitioner and his co-defendant for past 
and ongoing terrorist offences. During the course of 
these investigations, the security agencies installed a GPS 
tracking device in the petitioner’s vehicle. The device 
recorded a vehicle’s location, movements, and speeds 
along with the corresponding dates and times. In this 
way, it permitted the investigators to construct a complete 
picture of the car’s past and present movements. 
In this case, the federal investigators not only used 
GPS technology, but also conducted visual surveillance 
and monitored his telephone and his mail. These together 
permit a fairly detailed reconstruction of a target’s daily 
activities. The petitioner appealed against his attempted 
murder convictions for carrying out a series of terrorist 
bombings. His petition challenged the state’s use of GPS 
technology to monitor his movements. The petitioner 
argued that the accumulation of different modes of 
surveillance exposed too much personal information to the 
government. The petitioner further claimed the evidence 
obtained through the Global Positioning System could not 
have been used to convict him without infringing his right 
to a fair trial. In upholding the use of GPS technology, the 
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s claims. 
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ARE THERE ANY LIMITS THAT CAN BE 
PLACED ON THE POWER OF TECHNOLOGY 
FOR PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY?
“The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may 
enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his forces dare 
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”
- Sir William Pitt 117
Electronic surveillance is an essential part of modern 
policing, but we cannot rely on the courts to ensure that 
public authorities do not infringe fundamental liberties 
of the individuals. Thus, there is indeed a need for a 
proper legislative framework to cover the whole range 
of espionage operations. But unfortunately, most states 
are reluctant to confront fundamental issues relating to 
policing and privacy. They have consistently failed to 
determine the extent of privacy and impose adequate 
controls on surveillance and interception activities of 
their public authorities. For example, in the U.S the 
Fourth Amendment states that ‘the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.’118 But this statutory provision failed to answer 
the question: how much privacy should one enjoy? or 
how much privacy should be left for individual enjoyment 
from the intrusion of law enforcement authority? 
In the landmark decision of Katz v United States,119 
the U.S. Supreme Court analysed the Fourth Amendment 
violations and determined its periphery by rejecting the 
notion of constitutionally protected areas and adopting a 
new emphasis on the individual expectation of privacy.120 
In Katz v United States,121 Katz was convicted under an 
indictment charging him with transmitting wagering 
information by telephone across state lines in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. 1084. Katz’s conversations were intercepted 
by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening 
and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth 
from which Katz made calls. The recorded conversations 
are introduced at the trial as evidence. In the Court of 
Appeals, Katz has phrased the following questions: 
1. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally 
protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching 
an electronic listening recording device to the top of 
such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to 
privacy of the user of the booth? 
2. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally 
protected area is necessary before a search and 
seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding 
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation since there 
was no physical entry into the telephone booth from where 
Katz made the call. Furthermore, later the Supreme Court 
rejected the longstanding view that a Fourth Amendment 
violation must be coupled with a physical intrusion into 
“a constitutionally protected area.”122 In the Court’s view, 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection,” it became clear that “what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”123 The 
decision expressly overruled Olmstead124 and Goldman125, 
asserting that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment 
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion into any given enclosure.”126 In this case Justice 
Harlan articulated his celebrated ‘expectation of privacy’ 
test for defining legitimate warrantless surveillance by 
electronic devices.127 According to Justice Harlan, the 
application of Fourth Amendment protection is predicated 
upon a twofold test. These are as follows:
Firstly, a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, 
Secondly, the expectation should be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable. 
But Harlan’s test is not free from criticism as it failed 
to provide appropriate remedies in many circumstances. 
The famous jurist Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel 
said, “as the case law developed, it became clear that 
when interpreting the subjective prong of Harlan’s 
test, it is not sufficient that [the expectation] be merely 
reasonable; something in addition is required.”128 With an 
illustration I can make the problem easier for readers to 
understand: If two notorious drug dealers, X and Y were 
to rely on the privacy of an isolated corner of Romna 
Park in the middle of the night to carry out an illegal 
transaction. It would be a reasonable for both of them 
to expect privacy as there would be virtually no risk of 
discovery. But fortunately if Z, a policeman present at the 
park at the same time and sheds light on the crime spot 
with his flashlight, it would be foolish for the criminals 
to suppress the officer’s testimony as a violation of their 
rights. 
The hypothetical criminals in the given scenario 
“rationally considered their transaction to involve little 
risk of discovery. Rather, the expectation of privacy is 
intended to be a basis of differentiating those expectations 
which are merely reasonable from those expectations 
which are to be constitutionally enforced due to other 
social considerations.”129 Thus, the emergent framework 
established that “expectations of privacy that society 
is prepared to recognise as legitimate have, at least in 
theory, the greatest protection; diminished expectations 
of privacy are more easily invaded; and subjective 
expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to 
recognize as legitimate have no protection.”130 A literal 
interpretation of Justice Harlan's test requires that the 
defendant have an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy to invoke constitutional protections. The Court’s 
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further expounding of the doctrine has clarified that 
the standard strictly depends upon the expectations of 
privacy that society deems reasonable.131 The Supreme 
Court in Katz rejected Olmstead’s strictly property-based 
conception of the Fourth Amendment, holding instead that 
‘the Fourth Amendment protects, people, not places.’132 
Therefore, even though Katz’s telephone conversations 
were intangible and not literally his ‘houses, papers, 
[or] effects’ and even though they were transmitted via 
the phone company’s property, they were protected by 
the Fourth Amendment against search or seizure by the 
government. It was recognized in Katz case that the 
Fourth Amendment protects society’s shared expectations 
about what is private, and applied Fourth Amendment 
protections based on the telephone’s vital societal role 
as a medium for private communication.133 
In Florida v Riley,134 a county sheriff’s office hired 
a helicopter, and flew over the defendant’s property at 
an altitude of roughly four-hundred feet for tracking 
a marijuana-growing field. Through aerial naked-eye 
observations, the law enforcement officer discovered a 
marijuana field in the defendant’s backyard greenhouse. 
Based upon this information, a search warrant was issued 
to enter the premises, and the defendant was charged with 
possession of an illegal substance under state law. The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming 
that the warrantless aerial surveillance constituted a 
violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy against 
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. 
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and on 
appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that the helicopter 
surveillance from four-hundred feet established a search 
for which a warrant was required. In the view of Florida’s 
highest court, such conduct must be assessed in light 
of society’s standards of reasonableness in order to be 
considered an unacceptable intrusion into the privacy of 
the home.135 However the United States Supreme Court 
reversed this decision. In the majority opinion by Justice 
White, the Court reasoned that although the defendant no 
doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would 
not be open to public inspection, by leaving the sides 
and roof of the structure partially open to the aerial view, 
the contents of the greenhouse were subject to viewing 
from the air. Thus, the defendant “could not reasonably 
have expected that his greenhouse was protected from 
public or official observation from a helicopter ... flying 
within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing aircraft.” The 
majority concluded that helicopter flights at four-hundred 
feet are not “sufficiently rare in this country to lend 
substance to [the defendant’s] claim that he reasonably 
anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject 
to [aerial] observation.” Accordingly, in the Court’s 
view, the defendant could not possess any reasonable 
expectation of privacy by societal standards under the 
Katz search test. 
In Dow Chemical Co. v United States,136 Dow 
Chemical operates a 2,000-acre facility manufacturing 
chemicals at Midland, Michigan. The facility consists 
of numerous covered buildings, with manufacturing 
equipment and piping conduits located between the 
various buildings exposed to visual observation from 
the air. Dow Chemical maintained elaborate security 
around the perimeter of the complex, barring ground-
level public views of these areas. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) failed to get permission for an 
on-site inspection of the plant, employed a commercial 
aerial photographer to take aerial photographs of the 
facility remaining within lawful navigable airspace 
without seeking on a search warrant. The photographer 
used a standard precision aerial mapping camera for 
this purpose. Being aware of the aerial photography, 
Dow Chemical brought suit in Federal District Court, 
alleging that EPA’s action violated the Fourth Amendment 
and was carried out beyond its statutory investigative 
authority. The District Court granted summary judgment 
for the petitioner, but the Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that EPA’s aerial observation did not exceed its 
investigatory authority and that the aerial photography of 
the petitioner’s plant complex without a warrant was not 
a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court found that though commercial areas receive 
constitutional privacy protection, this protection does not 
extend to the outdoor areas of industrial complexes. 
The Court also found that homes and their outside areas 
receive a higher level of protection than commercial 
areas. In dicta the Court stated, “Surveillance of private 
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance 
equipment not generally available to the public, such as 
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed 
absent a warrant.”137 Further it was mentioned, ‘The open 
areas of an industrial plant complex such as petitioner’s 
are not analogous to the curtilage of a dwelling, which 
is entitled to protection as a place where the occupants 
have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to accept (citation omitted). The 
intimate activities associated with family privacy and the 
home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor 
areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a 
manufacturing plant. For purposes of aerial surveillance, 
the open areas of an industrial complex are more 
comparable to an open field in which an individual may 
not legitimately demand privacy.138 
Here, EPA did not employ some unique sensory 
device which was not available to the public, but rather 
employed a conventional, albeit precise, commercial 
camera commonly used in map-making. The photographs 
were not so revealing of intimate details as to raise 
constitutional concerns. The mere fact that human 
vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, 
does not give rise to constitutional problems.’139 In this 
case Burger C.J., said “We emphasized that, unlike a 
homeowner’s interest in his dwelling, ‘[t]he interest of 
the owner of commercial property is not one in being 
free from any inspections (citation omitted).’And with 
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regard to regulatory inspections, we have held that 
‘what is observable by the public is observable, without 
a warrant, by the Government inspector as well.”140 The 
Court feared that technology providing information 
not available to the naked eye would reveal intimate 
details, for example, imaging that could reveal actions 
occurring inside a building.141 Despite this concern, the 
Court noted that photos enhancing human vision were 
still admissible, provided that they do not reveal such 
intimate details.142 
A contrary decision was found in DuPont v 
Christopher.143 In this case, an unknown party hired the 
defendants to take aerial photographs of new construction 
at a DuPont chemical plant in Beaumont, Texas. DuPont 
had developed a secret process for producing methanol, 
which gave it a competitive advantage over other 
manufacturers. DuPont alleged that the defendants were 
engaged in industrial espionage, and that their deliberate 
over-flights violated its trade secret rights and industrial 
privacy. The defendants responded that they had every 
right to fly over the plant and were not trespassing. They 
claimed that anyone could legitimately fly through that 
airspace and aim a camera at the ground. 
Therefore, DuPont could not claim protection over 
such aerial evidence any more than over what a passer-
by could see in plain view by walking outside the plant 
on a public road. The court rejected this argument. It 
held that aerial photography was “an improper means 
of obtaining another’s trade secret,” because it was a 
form of espionage that “could not have been reasonably 
anticipated or prevented” by DuPont. Dow Chemical 
Co. v United States can be distinguished from DuPont v 
Christopher. Dow Chemical discussed the issues of illegal 
government search and DuPont was concerned with the 
issues of trade secret infringement. But at a conceptual 
level, both cases raised the same question: if aerial 
photography of a location was a reasonably expected 
phenomenon, or an improper intrusion? These two 
cases provided two different approaches in determining 
the parameter of privacy. But one common thing they 
established that aerial and satellite data is admissible if 
it is properly conducted. 
Last of all I would like to discuss another case to 
shed light on the particular point. In Barbra Streisand 
v Kenneth Adelman, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Los 
Angeles Superior Court, seeking an injunction for barring 
the defendant from continuing to distribute aerial images 
of her home, as the photos provide a ‘road map into her 
residence’ and ‘clearly identify those routes that could be 
used to enter her property.’ The defendant operates the 
California Coastal Records Project, which specialises 
in aerial photographs of the California coast, images 
intended for use by scientists and researchers. He has 
posted more than 12,000 high-resolution digital aerial 
images of the coastline on a website, where they are freely 
available for download. The plaintiffs sued the defendant 
for invasion of privacy and violation of California’s anti-
paparazzi law. The judge rejected plaintiff’s claim, finding 
that “Aerial views are a common part of daily living, and 
that there is nothing offensive about the manner in which 
they occur, nor in the manner in which this particular view 
was obtained.”144 This decision was given in the light of 
the Dow case. I hope in future we will receive further 
guidance from the U.S judiciary which will help us to 
know the exact parameters of the right of privacy.
In the final analysis, we may conclude that the 
extent of guaranteed privacy of an individual is still 
uncharted area for the modern law; therefore it is for the 
judiciary to assess the validity of police action against 
a set of coherent standards (Test of essentiality and 
proportionality). It should also be noted that court should 
not rely on any surveillance evidence when its procedural 
safeguards are infringed. Further it must be mentioned 
that the use of legitimated electronic intrusion only 
acceptable for protecting citizens from lawlessness or to 
preserve domestic tranquillity otherwise not.
CONCLUSION
Nowadays the state is one of the countless numbers of 
surveilling entities that have a legal authority to gather 
information regarding anything or any person. Most 
states have a legal framework authorising surveillance 
activities but they do not provide sturdy shield against any 
intrusion. Limited scope of prevailing legal regulations 
left much surveillance practice beyond authorisation, 
and information gathered from surveillance must not be 
disclosed in normal circumstances. Stringent legal rules 
are required with regard to disclosure of information, 
rather than restricting access to it. It is true, after 9/11 
technology-driven loss of privacy inevitably became 
a negative development rather than something to be 
cherished as law enforcement agencies are doing more 
than they are authorised to do. As a result, an intrusion 
of privacy is not always considered as usurpation of the 
individual’s right by the concerned authorities. 
Sturdy rules are therefore, required for regulating law 
enforcement agencies surveillance activities, which is not 
an easy matter to accomplish. On the one hand the law 
makers have to give the public authorities unprecedented 
power to conduct surveillance to safeguard the interest of 
a state, on the other hand they must empower the judiciary 
to grant an immediate remedy if anyone acts beyond their 
power conferred by statutes and intrudes others privacy. 
Most developed countries have successfully invented a 
mechanism to protect the right of privacy of an individual 
by empowering the judiciary to provide guidelines to the 
government agencies for conducting surveillance for the 
interest of the nation. Side by side, they gave the judiciary 
an absolute authority to use its discretion to accept or 
reject evidence procured from surveillance. 
In some countries, for example Bangladesh, 
there is no adequate legislation and precedents on the 
admissibility of covert surveillance evidence. It is 
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recommended that these countries may follow the above 
mentioned precedents related to the covert surveillance 
evidence. The Evidence Act 1872 (Bangladesh) does not 
have provision of covert surveillance evidence nor the 
admissibility of digital message communicated through 
the internet. Unlike the evidence law of Bangladesh, 
the Indian Evidence Act 1872 has been amended by the 
Indian Information Technology Act 2000 to elaborately 
deal with the issues of admissibility of electronic 
records.145 However, Bangladesh has enacted Information 
and Communication Technology Act 2006 (ICT Act 2006) 
which has clear provision to recognize the digital message 
and to use digital message in the court as evidence. 
Similarly, the Evidence Act 1950 (Malaysia) provides 
that digital information can be used as evidence in the 
court.146 
In the absence of clear laws on the admissibility 
of covert surveillance evidence, concern countries’ 
law makers may shed light on this particular topic and 
successfully fill the gap between ‘individual’s right to 
leading a peaceful life’ and the ‘right to retain the privacy’. 
For this purpose a fair and up to date state policy must 
be adopted. The policy should contain a clear definition 
of what is (and is not) acceptable use of surveillance 
evidence, leaving the citizens in as little doubt as possible 
as to where the boundaries lie. A ‘zero tolerance’ policy 
must not be adopted, as it may have drawbacks in terms 
of preventing the nourishment of an individual’s right that 
could ultimately lead to a paradoxical situation. A more 
balanced policy might be adopted to limit the power of 
public authorities that authorises espionage and judiciary 
must be equipped properly to handle cases related to 
surveillance evidence. This can only be achieved if a 
draconian power is conferred on the judiciary, which will 
enable them to use ‘the discretionary rule of admissibility 
of evidence’ freely along with exclusionary rule. For 
doing so ‘due diligence’ must be practiced to ensure: 
(a) accountability of public authorities; (b) maintaining 
the proportionality and essentiality remaining in their 
jurisdiction; (c) maintaining proper disclosure when cases 
will face judicial action, (d) maintaining the strength of 
the judiciary to shape the occupational and professional 
culture of the enforcement agencies. Vigilant citizens will 
not have any objection in accepting any intrusion which 
legitimately limits the individual’s right of privacy if the 
mentioned criteria are followed.
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